[screen 1]
A network of accounts spreads divisive content. Are they state intelligence operatives? Commercial troll farms? Ideological activists? The lines are increasingly blurred.
Understanding who conducts information manipulation - and the relationships between actors - is essential for effective defense and attribution.
[screen 2]
State Actors
Foreign governments conduct information operations through multiple organs:
Intelligence services: Covert operations, cultivating assets
Military units: Specialized information warfare divisions
Diplomatic missions: Amplifying narratives, engaging local media
State media: RT, Xinhua, Press TV - overt propaganda with sophisticated presentation
Think tanks and cultural institutes: Soft power and narrative shaping
States have resources, coordination, and strategic objectives that distinguish them from other actors.
[screen 3]
State Capabilities and Resources
Governments bring significant advantages to information operations:
- Funding: Sustained operations over years or decades
- Coordination: Integration across agencies and countries
- Intelligence: Information gathering to inform targeting
- Technical: Cyber capabilities, AI, data analytics
- Diplomatic: Ability to pressure platforms and media
- Legitimacy: Official status lends credibility to messaging
These resources enable sophisticated, persistent campaigns impossible for most non-state actors.
[screen 4]
The Russian Model
Russia has demonstrated the most sophisticated and prolific FIMI operations:
Internet Research Agency (IRA): Troll farm creating fake personas and content
GRU: Military intelligence conducting cyber and information operations
FSB: Domestic security service with foreign operations capability
RT and Sputnik: State media outlets in multiple languages
Think tanks and foundations: Cultivating relationships and influence
Coordination: Integrated campaigns across these actors
Russia’s approach combines volume, persistence, and adaptation.
[screen 5]
The Chinese Approach
China’s information operations reflect different priorities and methods:
Focus: Defending regime, advancing geopolitical interests, promoting Chinese model
Methods: Volume over sophistication, using vast networks of inauthentic accounts
Targets: Diaspora communities, countries with economic ties, international institutions
Narrative: Economic development, stability, and criticizing Western democracy
Adaptation: Increasingly sophisticated as capabilities grow
China’s operations are less focused on disruption than Russia’s, more on promotion and defense.
[screen 6]
State-Adjacent Actors
Many FIMI operations use entities with plausible independence from states:
State-funded media: Nominally independent but following state narratives
Government-linked NGOs: Civil society organizations with state ties
Business entities: Companies with state ownership or pressure
Academic institutions: Think tanks with state funding
Cultural organizations: Promoting language and culture with political messaging
This structure enables plausible deniability while advancing state objectives.
[screen 7]
Commercial Actors
For-profit companies offer information manipulation services:
Troll farms: Creating content and fake engagement for hire
PR and marketing firms: “Reputation management” including inauthentic activity
Data analytics companies: Targeting and psychological profiling
Bot operators: Selling amplification and fake followers
Ad tech: Programmatic advertising for propaganda
Some work for states, others for commercial clients, many for both. Financial motivation distinguishes them from ideological actors.
[screen 8]
Non-State Ideological Actors
Not all information manipulation comes from states:
Extremist groups: Far-right, far-left, religious extremists
Single-issue activists: Anti-vaccination, conspiracy theorists
Geopolitical movements: Pan-nationalist or pan-religious movements
Local political actors: Domestic groups using foreign tactics
These actors may operate independently or align with state interests opportunistically. Motivations are ideological rather than geopolitical or financial.
[screen 9]
Proxy Relationships
States increasingly operate through proxies to enable deniability:
Direct proxies: Entities directly controlled but officially independent
Indirect proxies: Funded or influenced but with some autonomy
Useful idiots: Unaware they’re advancing foreign interests
Opportunistic alignment: Independent actors whose goals temporarily align with state interests
Attribution becomes difficult when genuine activists unwittingly amplify state-sponsored narratives.
[screen 10]
The Blurred Boundary
Distinguishing state from non-state actors is increasingly difficult:
- Commercial actors work for states
- States cultivate and fund “grassroots” movements
- Ideological actors coordinate with states when interests align
- States use platforms and techniques indistinguishable from commercial actors
- True believers amplify state narratives organically
This ambiguity is strategic - attribution challenges enable plausible deniability.
[screen 11]
Motivations and Objectives
Different actor types pursue different goals:
States: Geopolitical advantage, undermining adversaries, defending regime
Commercial: Profit from providing manipulation services
Ideological: Advancing political or social worldview
Criminal: Financial fraud through misinformation
Personal: Individual grievances or attention-seeking
Understanding motivation helps predict behavior and design countermeasures.
[screen 12]
Coordination and Independence
Information manipulation operations fall on a spectrum:
Fully coordinated: Single directing actor with controlled subsidiaries
Loosely coordinated: Multiple actors with informal cooperation
Convergent: Independent actors with aligned interests acting similarly
Organic amplification: State content spread by genuine users
Most sophisticated operations combine centralized coordination with organic amplification.
[screen 13]
Domestic vs. Foreign Actors
The domestic/foreign distinction matters legally and strategically:
Foreign actors: FIMI, subject to foreign interference responses
Domestic actors: Subject to free speech protections and limited state intervention
Domestic actors amplifying foreign content: Complex legal and ethical questions
Foreign-funded domestic actors: Transparency and disclosure requirements
Democratic responses must distinguish between foreign interference and domestic discourse, even when they’re hard to separate.
[screen 14]
The Evolving Landscape
The actor landscape is evolving:
- More states developing capabilities
- Commercial market for information manipulation growing
- Techniques democratizing - easier for smaller actors
- Platforms improving detection, forcing adaptation
- International coordination improving attribution
- Legal frameworks addressing foreign influence
Understanding actors isn’t static - continuous learning is required as the landscape changes.
[screen 15]
Why Actor Attribution Matters
Identifying who is behind operations enables:
- Appropriate responses: Diplomatic, legal, or technical countermeasures
- Public awareness: Exposing operations reduces effectiveness
- Platform action: Removal based on coordinated inauthentic behavior
- Legal accountability: Sanctions, prosecutions where applicable
- Strategic understanding: Analyzing adversary tactics and objectives
But attribution is technically and politically challenging - covered in detail in Module 5.